Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." originally appeared in the June 2008 issue of Vietnam magazine. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. 5. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. Thus, the South Vietnamese raid on Hon Me Island, a major North Vietnamese infiltration staging point, became the tripwire that set off the August 2 confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin. The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. It is not NSA's intention to prove or The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. PTF-1 and PTF-2 were U.S.-built 1950s vintage boats pulled out of mothballs and sent to Vietnam. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Just before midnight, the four boats cut their engines. It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. This was the first of several carefully worded official statements aimed at separating 34A and Desoto and leaving the impression that the United States was not involved in the covert operations.9 Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. :: Douglas Pike, director of the Indochina Studies Program at the University of California-Berkeley, is the author of the forthcoming "Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.: Anatomy of an Alliance.". If there had been any doubt before about whose hand was behind the raids, surely there was none now. . The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. 4. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. IV-2 to IV-4. He also requested air support. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. But we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit, Johnson said. The Taliban silenced him. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. He spoke out against banning girls education. The Maddox fired againthis time to killhitting the second North Vietnamese boat just as it launched two torpedoes. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. Under cover of darkness, four boats (PTF-2, PTF-3, PTF-5, and PTF-6) left Da Nang, racing north up the coast toward the demilitarized zone (DMZ), then angling farther out to sea as they left the safety of South Vietnamese waters.2 About five hours later they neared their objective: the offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu. The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. . American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. After several early failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. Thats what all the country wants, because Goldwater's raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon, and they say that we oughtn't to do anything that the national interest doesn't require. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. . As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT Volume II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 By Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald Government Printing Office for The Naval Historical Center 591 pp. As the enemy boat passed astern, it was raked by gunfire from the Maddox that killed the boats commander. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . Send the First Troops to Vietnam? In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two 8. "4 At the White House, administration officials panicked as the public spotlight illuminated their policy in Vietnam and threatened to reveal its covert roots. The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. And, of course, McNamara himself knew about the "South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands," but his cautiously worded answer got him out of admitting it. He has appeared on The History Channel as a featured expert. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. 9/11. Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. Naval Institute. Congress supported the resolution with ." The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. Herrick requested aerial reconnaissance for the next morning to search for the wreckage of the torpedo boats he thought he had sunk. The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." 1, p. 646. The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. President Johnson himself apparently questioned the sailorsu0019 report of an attack. The three torpedo boats continued through the American barrage and launched their torpedoes at 1516. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. Thousands of passengers are stranded after Colombias Viva Air grounds flights, The last of Mexicos artisanal salt-makers preserve a 2,000-year-old tradition, I cannot give up: Cambodian rapper says he will sing about injustice despite threats from govt, Ukrainian rock star reflects on a year of war in his country, Ukrainian refugees in Poland will now be charged to stay in state-funded housing, This Colombian town is dimming its lights to attract more tourists to view the night sky, Kneel and apologize!: 76 years after island-wide massacre, Taiwan continues to commemorate and debate the tragedy. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. The history stops with the U.S. Navy moving into full combat duty -- the naval and air interdictions in South and North Vietnam -- the subject of future volumes. Here's why he couldn't walk away. Both men believed an attack on the American ships was imminent. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. In a conversation with Johnson, McNamara confirmedthis, with a reference to OP-CON 34A,acovert operation against the North Vietnamese. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). That initial error shaped all the subsequent assessments about North Vietnamese intentions, as U.S. SIGINT monitored and reported the Norths tracking of the two American destroyers. For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two The battle was over in 22 minutes. Vaccines. McNamara and the JCS believed that this intercept decisively provided the smoking gun of the second attack, and so the president reported to the American people and Congress. The NSA report is revealing. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. When Did the U.S. 2. . The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. 2, pp. Or purchase a subscription for unlimited access to real news you can count on. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. . 302-303. A distinction is made in these pages between the Aug. 2 "naval engagement" and the somewhat more ambiguous Aug. 4 "naval action," although Marolda and Fitzgerald make it clear they accept that the Aug. 4 action left one and possibly two North Vietnamese torpedo-firing boats sunk or dead in the water. Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. Captain John J. Herrick, Commander Destroyer Division 192, embarked in the Maddox, concluded that there would be "possible hostile action." Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). WebTo many online conspiracy theorists, the biggest false flag operation of all time was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. NSA officials handed the key August SIGINT reports over to the JCS investigating team that examined the incident in September 1964. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. 10. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived on-scene at 1528 hours and fired on the boats. This volume deals only with the former. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Hickman, Kennedy. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. Historians still disagree over whether Johnson deliberately misled Congress and the American people about the Tonkin Gulf incident or simply capitalized on an opportunity that came his way. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. The Health Conspiracy. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. Hanoi was more than willing to tell the world about the attacks, and it took either a fool or an innocent to believe that the United States knew nothing about the raids. Not all wars are made for navies, and the U.S. Navy had to insinuate itself into the Vietnam one and carve out a role. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. No one was hurt and little damage wasdone in the attack, but intercepted cables suggested a second attack might be imminent. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. Changing course in time to evade the torpedoes, the Maddox again was attacked, this time by a boat that fired another torpedo and 14.5-mm machine guns. WebKnown today as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, this event spawned the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 7 August 1964, ultimately leading to open war between North Vietnam and One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol. Media Manipulation. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North But Morse did not know enough about the program to ask pointed questions. McNamara was ready to respond. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. no isolated event. When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble.